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Where do risk preferences come from? How 
do we decide if it is safe to eat unpasteurized 
cheese, whether to take up paragliding or 
mini-golf as a new hobby, whether to save 
in government bonds or place our money 
in a new technology hedge fund?
Asking about the origin of risk pref-
erence in this general form requires two 
presuppositions, both of which may be 
challenged. The first presupposition is that 
there is some unitary basis to decisions 
about risk, where the nature of such risks 
(whether food poisoning, instant death, 
social embarrassment, or financial disaster) 
may vary substantially. The second presup-
position is this unitary basis determines sta-
ble risk preferences, which help determining 
our choices when faced with risk.
Regarding the first issue, Slovic (1987) 
has argued persuasively that there are many 
dimensions to the perception of risk (e.g., 
level of knowledge, feeling of control, nov-
elty), and that each dimensions influences 
decision-making differently. Moreover, 
many studies have shown that the superfi-
cial characteristics of the same underlying 
risk (e.g., whether that risk is framed as a 
gamble, investment, or insurance problem) 
leads to wildly varying, and fairly uncor-
related, choices (Vlaev et al., 2010). Results 
such as these raise the possibility that the 
process of psychological or emotional risk-
taking is divided into a multitude of differ-
ent mechanisms.
Regarding the second issue, again a wide 
variety of studies indicate that people’s risky 
choices are enormously flexible, not merely 
because of the types of framing manipula-
tion mentioned above, but in virtue of the 
range of choice options presented. It is well 
known, for example, that people are much 
more likely to choose an option that is pre-
sented as a default (Johnson and Goldstein, 
2003). Moreover, people’s risk preferences 
can be radically shifted by changing the 
range of options available. One powerful 
illustration of this, prospect relativity, has 
been found with conventional risky  gambles 
(Stewart et al., 2003), in which people are 
happy to choose, say, a low-to-middle 
option in a range of low-risk-low-return 
alternatives, while simultaneously prefer-
ring a low-to-middle option in a completely 
non-overlapping range of high-risk-high-
return options. Thus, people will happily 
generate completely inconsistent choices 
concerning preferences of their optimal 
balance between risk and return, and may, 
indeed, give such contradictory choices 
within a few minutes, in a single experi-
mental session.
One approach to these concerns is to 
try to build a highly multifaceted and flex-
ible account of risk preference. We suggest 
pursuing an alternative strategy: to aim to 
explain how people make decisions, includ-
ing decisions about risk, without drawing 
on any underlying psychological notion of 
risk attitude at all.
Suppose, for example, that people make 
decisions about whether to eat unpasteur-
ized cheese, to paraglide, or invest in a hedge 
fund, simply by copying past behaviors. For 
example, if everybody eats unpasteurized 
cheese in my community, I will probably eat 
it too. If all my friends invest in hedge funds, 
it is likely that I will do it too. There has been 
an enormous amount of research from neu-
roscience to social science, and across a wide 
range of species, which suggests that imita-
tive behavior is widespread across the bio-
logical and social world (e.g., Whiten et al., 
2004; Boyd and Richerson, 2005; Hurley and 
Chater, 2005; Raafat et al., 2009).
Note too, that we also seek to copy our 
own past behavior. Thus, if I usually play 
the lottery, I will probably play it again this 
week; if I have skied many years, I am likely 
to continue. A particularly vivid illustration 
of the degree to which our current choices 
are shaped by our own previous behav-
ior is given by the phenomenon of choice 
blindness (Johansson et al., 2005). In a typi-
cal choice blindness task, people asked to 
choose which of two options they prefer; 
they are then given what they believe to be 
their chosen alternative and asked to justify 
their selection. Crucially, on a minority of 
trials a conjuring trick is used to present peo-
ple with the non-selected option. Typically 
people do not notice that they have been 
given the “wrong” option; moreover, they 
are also able to offer elaborate reasons for 
the choice they now believe they had made. 
These verbal reports have been analyzed on 
a number of different dimensions, such as 
the level of effort, emotionality, specificity, 
and certainty expressed, but no substantial 
differences between manipulated and non-
manipulated reports was found (Johansson 
et al., 2005, 2006). The lack of differentiation 
between reasons given for an actual and a 
manipulated choice is further evidence that 
there may be an element of confabulation in 
“truthful” reporting as well. In addition to 
attractiveness choices for faces and abstract 
patterns (Johansson et al., 2008), choice 
blindness has been demonstrated for taste 
and smell (Hall et al., 2010), and even for 
moral judgments involving hotly debated 
topics in the current political debate (Hall 
et al., submitted).
From the point of view of the present 
discussion, there is also recent evidence 
that this type of manipulation affects peo-
ple’s future choices and evaluations. In a 
new version of the original choice blind-
ness experiment, the participants had to 
choose between the same pairs of faces a 
second time, as well as separately rate all 
the faces at the end of the experiment. This 
procedure revealed that the manipulation 
induced a pronounced (but to the par-
ticipants unknown) preference change, 
as they came to prefer the originally non-
preferred face in subsequent choices, as 
well as rate the face they were led to believe 
they liked higher than the one they thought 
they rejected (Hall et al., in preparation). 
Similarly, but more dramatically, it has 
been shown that that choice blindness can 
strongly influence voting intentions just a 
week before a national election (Hall et al., 
in preparation).
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2010).
To summarize, the viewpoint that we 
have developed here has close relationships 
with the idea of “constructed preferences” 
described by Slovic (1995), i.e., the idea that 
people do not necessarily choose by tap-
ping into previously established preferences 
(whether preferences concerning risk, or any 
other dimension); but that they create their 
preferences, on-the-fly, during the decision-
making process. The present perspective 
pushes this line of thinking slightly further: 
rather than viewing people as construct-
ing risk preferences, we suggest that the 
  decision-making process is best explained 
without making reference to risk preferences 
at any stage. People’s risky choices are shaped 
directly by past choices or explanations of 
those choices, by themselves and others; and 
any coherence between choices will typically 
be limited to choices which share superficial 
features, where people can directly compare 
their present with their past.
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nance as an explanation for the effect. But 
it also has some notable contemporaries, 
like Dan Ariely with his coherent arbitrari-
ness model. Work by Ariely et al. (2003, 
2006) strongly suggests that arbitrary and 
irrelevant factors cannot only influence 
participants in their assessment of the 
utility of different goods (such as when 
rumination on the digits of their social 
security number leads participants to cre-
ate wildly different anchors for how much 
they are willing to pay a bottle of wine), 
but that these factors can be maintained 
through longer decision trajectories, cre-
ating a form of “coherent arbitrariness” 
(i.e., stable market patterns of revealed 
preferences; Ariely, 2008). In the words of 
Ariely and Norton: “These results dem-
onstrate a kind of ‘self-herding’, in which 
people observe their past behavior, infer 
some amount of utility and act in accord-
ance with the inference of utility, despite 
the fact that this behavior can be based 
not on the initial choice driven by hedonic 
utility but on any host of trivial situational 
factors that impacted the first decision” 
(Ariely and Norton, 2008, p.14).
From this perspective, though, to the 
degree that people’s choices are consist-
ent, such consistency will be enforced only 
where direct comparison between domains 
is possible. And we know from research on 
analogical reasoning that comparisons 
between domains is only possible when they 
are highly similar at the superficial level; 
“deep” links between problems with differ-
ent superficial characteristics are rarely rec-
ognized (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985; Chater 
and Vlaev, 2011). This suggests that we 
might expect people to be relatively consist-
ent with regards to whether they eat, or do 
not eat, different varieties of unpasteurized 
cheese; or whether they feel it safe to engage 
in different types of winter sports; but we 
would not expect any coherence across dif-
ferent risk domains. Similarly, narrowing to 
financial risk, we might expect people to be 
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insurance product, and hence, for example, 
have a general tendency to insure, or not 
to insure, their valuables. We would not 
expect people to be able to make compari-
sons between their insurance choices and 
their choices concerning whether to par-
ticipate in lotteries, or to invest in hedge 
funds. And, indeed, behavior does seem 
to be entirely incoherent across different 
Even more pertinent to the theme of this 
special issue is an ongoing study using false 
feedback in choices between probabilistic 
and sure outcomes (Kusev et al., in prepara-
tion), in which it was found that not only 
do the participants fail to notice manipula-
tions of what level of risk they are willing 
to accept, but they also change their overall 
risk preferences for repeated choice scenar-
ios, and in some conditions even show a 
complete preference reversal for the prob-
ability levels
1. Asymmetries and preference 
reversals for risk has been demonstrated 
before (see Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971, 
2006), but this is the first time it has been 
shown to be a consequence of a manipu-
lation of prior choices, thus adding to the 
accumulated evidence that people do in fact 
not have stable preferences for risk. If they 
had, it seems unlikely that they would both 
accept a reversal of their risky choices, and, 
crucially, adjust their subsequent choices in 
line with the manipulations made.
To the degree that our current behav-
ior is driven by past behavior (including 
our verbal explanations of that behavior), 
whether our own or other people’s, then 
behavior may be shaped with no direct 
reference to risk attitudes. Note, of course, 
that the determinants of our current 
behavior include much more than mere 
copying. Indeed, while it is possible that 
some imitative behaviors and habits may 
involve the replication of behavior with 
relatively little cognitive engagement (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis et al., 2000), there are also 
many cases were the impact of past behav-
ior is mediated by an attempt on the part of 
the decision-maker to provide a coherent 
explanation of his or her previous choices. 
This will not, in general, involve mere cop-
ying; indeed, the idea that we influence 
ourselves through the actions we take and 
the choices we make has a long history 
in psychology, with Festinger’s cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and Bem’s 
(1967) self-perception theory as the two 
classic theoretical rivals vying for domi-
1Kusev et al. (in preparation) also contains a series of 
experiments exploring other aspects of risky choice, 
showing that not only feedback but also context, task 
demands, and assimilation of perceptual information 
influence peoples’ risky choices. The ambition of Ku-
sev et al. (in preparation) is to create a comprehensive 
theory of risky choice, but in the current paper we 
have narrowed our focus to the role of self-feedback as 
a factor in the formation of preferences for risk.
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